1. [Russian Federation](#russian-federation) - [FAB Series (General Purpose)](#fab-series-general-purpose) - [FAB + UMPK Glide Kit](#fab--umpk-glide-kit)

1. [DECISION TREE: Artillery Projectile Identification](#decision-tree) 2. [CALIBER ESTIMATION GUIDE](#caliber-estimation) 3. [122mm PROFILES](#122mm-profiles)

1. [122mm PROJECTILES (D-30 / 2S1)](#122mm-projectiles) - [OF-462 HE-Frag](#of-462-he-frag) - [OF-462Zh (Sintered Iron Band Variant)](#of-462zh)

Australia operates one of the most advanced drone fleets in the Indo-Pacific, anchored by the MQ-28A Ghost Bat (Boeing loyal wingman), MQ-4C Triton maritime surveillance, MQ-9B for armed ISR, and ScanEagle for tactical use. DSTG (Defence Science and Technology Group) conducts advanced autonomy and c

Australia does not currently maintain an offensive mine warfare inventory but trains in MCM operations extensively. Australia is party to the Ottawa Treaty (1997) -- AP mines withdrawn. AT mine stocks: Under the AUKUS trilateral security partnership:

- FEB 2024: Sank Ivanovets (Tarantul-class corvette), Lake Donuzlav - FEB 2024: Sank Caesar Kunikov (Ropucha-class landing ship) - MAR 2024: Sank Sergey Kotov (Bykov-class patrol ship)

1. [Type 72 (AP)](#type-72-ap) 2. [Type 72A](#type-72a) 3. [Type 72B](#type-72b)

``` PROFILE: TYPE 72 / 72A / 72B / 72C AP MINE =============================================

1. [Executive Summary](#1-executive-summary) 2. [Force Structure Overview](#2-force-structure-overview) 3. [Strategic Systems](#3-strategic-systems)

1. [APP M-57 (Plastic Blast Mine)](#app-m-57) 2. [NK-PFM "Leaf Mine" (Scatterable Blast Mine)](#nk-pfm-leaf-mine) 3. [NK Box Mine (Wooden AP Blast Mine)](#nk-box-mine)

1. [Chinese-Derived Reconnaissance Drones (ASN-104/105 Derivatives)](#1-chinese-derived-reconnaissance-drones) 2. [Confirmed Incursion Drones (2014, 2017, 2022 Recoveries)](#2-confirmed-incursion-drones) 3. [Indigenous Designs Observed in Parades/Propaganda](#3-indigenous-designs-observed-in-parades

1. [Ballistic Missiles](#1-ballistic-missiles) 2. [Cruise Missiles](#2-cruise-missiles) 3. [Rocket Artillery / MLRS](#3-rocket-artillery--mlrs)

``` UNIVERSAL DPRK ORDNANCE RECOGNITION CUES ==========================================

The portal allows filtering by: OSMP includes explanatory guides at https://osmp.ngo/resources/: 1. Search by Tentative Model for specific items in our `image_catalog.md`

1. **No dedicated submunitions files** for Russia, DPRK, Iran, or any country other than China 2. **No mortar-specific file** for any country 3. **No fuze-specific file** for any country

1. [IED Components (SIMPCE)](#ied-components-simpce) 2. [IED Classification by Initiation](#ied-classification-by-initiation) 3. [Pressure Plate VOIED](#pressure-plate-voied)

1. [PMA-1A](#pma-1a) 2. [PMA-2](#pma-2) 3. [PMA-3](#pma-3)

1. **VOG-17M + tail fins:** Small steel grenade body with plastic cruciform fins on base 2. **Hand grenade in cradle:** Frag grenade (F-1, RGD-5) sitting in 3D-printed drop cradle 3. **RKG-3 + rigid fins:** Stick grenade with plastic fins replacing drogue parachute

Standard VOG-17M grenade with factory-produced or 3D-printed tail fin assembly replacing the cartridge case/propellant section. Designed to stabilize the grenade during vertical drop from a drone. Standard hand grenades (typically RGD-5, F-1, or RGN/RGO) modified for drone release. The grenade pin i

1. [Anti-Ship Missiles](#1-anti-ship-missiles) 2. [Ballistic Missiles](#2-ballistic-missiles) 3. [Cruise Missiles / Land-Attack](#3-cruise-missiles--land-attack)

India operates one of the largest and most diverse drone inventories in the Indo-Pacific, combining significant indigenous development via DRDO and private sector with major imports from Israel and the United States. India's drone ecosystem spans target drones, tactical ISR, MALE/HALE platforms, loi

1. **Indian ordnance markings** typically include English and Hindi text, DRDO lot numbers, date of manufacture, and explosive weight markings. 2. **BrahMos** is the most likely cruise missile to be encountered in the INDOPACOM theater -- know its profile. 3. **Liquid-fueled Prithvi** variants pose

Indonesia operates a diverse drone fleet reflecting its multi-source procurement strategy, with Chinese, Turkish, and indigenous systems. The TNI (Indonesian National Armed Forces) prioritizes maritime surveillance across the archipelago's vast waters. Indonesia's indigenous drone industry is growin

Indonesia has expressed interest in and may have procured Yakhont/P-800 for coastal defense. Confirmation limited. Indonesia acceded to the Ottawa Treaty in 2007. AP mine stocks destroyed. AT mines from US/legacy sources remain. Indonesia operates one of the world's most diverse military inventories

1. [Shahed Series (Loitering Munitions / OWA-UAV)](#1-shahed-series) 2. [Mohajer Series (ISR / Armed MALE)](#2-mohajer-series) 3. [Ababil Series & Houthi Qasef Variants](#3-ababil-series--houthi-qasef-variants)

1. [Iranian Ballistic Missiles](#1-iranian-ballistic-missiles) 2. [Iranian Cruise Missiles](#2-iranian-cruise-missiles) 3. [Iranian Anti-Ship Missiles](#3-iranian-anti-ship-missiles)

1. [YM-I (AP Blast -- TS-50/VS-50 Copy)](#ym-i) 2. [YM-I-B / YM-I-S (AP Blast -- Smoke Variant)](#ym-i-b--ym-i-s) 3. [Pedal Mine No. 4 (AP Blast)](#pedal-mine-no-4)

On October 7, 2023, Hamas launched a multi-axis assault on Israel from the Gaza Strip using land vehicles, powered paragliders, speedboats, and explosive-laden drones. Over 1,200 people were killed and approximately 250 taken hostage. Hamas fighters employed rockets, RPGs, small arms, IEDs, mortars,

Japan's drone program has historically been limited compared to regional peers, reflecting constitutional constraints and a defense posture focused on manned platforms. However, rapid capability expansion is underway driven by China's military buildup and the lessons of Ukraine. Japan is acquiring U

Japan acceded to the Ottawa Treaty in 2003 -- AP mines withdrawn from JGSDF service. Most JASDF/JMSDF air-delivered ordnance is US-origin Mk 80 series or Japanese license-produced equivalents with Japanese lot markings. 1. **Japanese ordnance markings** use Kanji/Katakana designations alongside West

Malaysia's military drone fleet is relatively small, focused on tactical ISR for border surveillance (especially the Sabah/Sarawak jungle border with Indonesia and the Sulu Sea piracy zone), maritime patrol, and counter-terrorism. Systems are sourced from the US (ScanEagle), domestically produced (C

Reports indicate Malaysia has evaluated NSM for Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program. Limited information on Malaysian naval mine inventory. RMN has mine countermeasures capability (Mahamiru-class MCMV). Malaysia has not signed the Ottawa Treaty.

``` THREAT: Noor (C-802) | TYPE: AShCM | RANGE: 120 km | SPEED: Mach 0.9 WARHEAD: 165 kg semi-AP HE | SEEKER: Active radar | WARNING TIME: ~60 sec at 50 km

``` 1.0 GENERAL FORM FACTOR │

1. [CHINA (PRC)](#china-prc) - [Ballistic Missiles (DF Series)](#china-ballistic-missiles) - [Cruise Missiles (CJ Series)](#china-cruise-missiles)

1. [82mm Mortar Rounds (Soviet/Russian)](#82mm-mortar-rounds) 2. [120mm Mortar Rounds (Soviet/Russian)](#120mm-mortar-rounds) 3. [160mm Mortar Rounds (Soviet/Russian)](#160mm-mortar-rounds)

1. Body: Grey painted, smooth teardrop shape 2. Nose: Single PD fuze (alloy or brown/black bakelite) 3. Body max diameter: Smooth gas check band (no rotating band)

Myanmar's drone environment is one of the most complex and poorly documented in INDOPACOM. The Tatmadaw (Myanmar military) operates Chinese-origin armed UCAVs and has explored Turkish drone acquisitions. Simultaneously, ethnic resistance organizations (EROs) and the People's Defence Force (PDF) exte

Myanmar is one of the world's most mine-contaminated countries. Key facts for EOD: 1. **ACTIVE CONFLICT ZONE**: Myanmar is in active civil war. ALL ordnance is potentially encountered in an active, unstable environment. 2. **MINE CONTAMINATION** is severe and expanding. Every road, trail, and area p

1. [Conflict Overview](#1-conflict-overview) 2. [Tatmadaw Ordnance](#2-tatmadaw-ordnance) 3. [Resistance / EAO Ordnance](#3-resistance--eao-ordnance)

1. [SET-65](#set-65) 2. [USET-80](#uset-80) 3. [UGST "Fizik"](#ugst-fizik)

1. [Torpedo Visual ID](#torpedo-visual-id) 2. [Depth Charge / ASW Rocket Visual ID](#depth-charge--asw-rocket-visual-id) 3. [Naval Mine Visual ID](#naval-mine-visual-id)

1. [Executive Summary](#1-executive-summary) 2. [Iranian State Forces](#2-iranian-state-forces) 3. [Proxy Forces -- Individual Assessments](#3-proxy-forces----individual-assessments)

Use this structure for each ordnance item entry.

For each item, collect images matching the checklist. Mark boxes `[x]` as images are acquired. Update the **Status** field accordingly: Priority sources key: - [ ] Full profile view

Pakistan operates a growing drone fleet combining Chinese-origin armed UCAVs, domestically developed tactical ISR platforms (with significant Chinese technical assistance), and Turkish imports. Pakistan has employed drones extensively in counter-terrorism operations in FATA/KPK and Balochistan. The

1. **Nuclear dimension**: Pakistan maintains tactical nuclear weapons (Nasr) alongside strategic systems. ANY Pakistani ballistic/cruise missile encounter requires nuclear possibility assessment. 2. **Chinese-origin systems** are pervasive -- be prepared for Chinese markings and fuzing conventions a

1. [Reconnaissance / ISR UAVs](#1-reconnaissance--isr-uavs) 2. [Armed / Strike UCAVs (MALE Class)](#2-armed--strike-ucavs-male-class) 3. [Stealth and Advanced UCAVs](#3-stealth-and-advanced-ucavs)

1. [Executive Summary](#1-executive-summary) 2. [Force Structure Overview](#2-force-structure-overview) 3. [Strategic Systems](#3-strategic-systems)

1. [Ballistic Missiles (DF Series and SLBMs)](#1-ballistic-missiles) 2. [Cruise Missiles](#2-cruise-missiles) 3. [Air-to-Air Missiles (PL Series)](#3-air-to-air-missiles)

1. [MZD-2 Anti-Personnel Fragmentation Submunition](#1-mzd-2-anti-personnel-fragmentation-submunition) 2. [MZD-4 Anti-Personnel Fragmentation Submunition](#2-mzd-4-anti-personnel-fragmentation-submunition) 3. [Type 81 122mm Rocket Submunitions (Full Family)](#3-type-81-122mm-rocket-submunitions)

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) operates a small but growing drone fleet focused on counter-insurgency (COIN), counter-terrorism, and maritime surveillance. Israeli systems form the backbone, with increasing interest in Turkish and US platforms. The Philippines' operational drone use has b

The Philippines faces active insurgent threats from: 1. **PRIMARILY US-ORIGIN INVENTORY**: AFP ordnance is overwhelmingly American. Standard US EOD procedures apply. 2. **BrahMos** is the newest and most capable system -- Indian/Russian origin, supersonic. See India entry for detailed specs.

This guide catalogs every legitimate open source for ordnance reference imagery, ranked by quality and coverage. Use this to systematically build the visual identification library. - DPRK Panel: annually updated, includes photos of Scud derivatives, missile components - Iran/Yemen Panel: Houthi

1. [9M22U HE-Frag](#9m22u-he-frag) 2. [9M22S Incendiary](#9m22s-incendiary) 3. [9M28K Mine-Laying (AT)](#9m28k-mine-laying)

1. [9M22U HE-Frag](#9m22u-he-frag) 2. [9M22S Incendiary](#9m22s-incendiary) 3. [9M28K Mine-Laying](#9m28k-mine-laying)

1. [Loitering Munitions / One-Way Attack (OWA)](#1-loitering-munitions--one-way-attack-owa) 2. [Iranian-Supplied / Russian-Manufactured OWA Drones](#2-iranian-supplied--russian-manufactured-owa-drones) 3. [Reconnaissance / ISR UAS](#3-reconnaissance--isr-uas)

1. [Ballistic Missiles](#1-ballistic-missiles) 2. [Cruise Missiles](#2-cruise-missiles) 3. [Anti-Ship Missiles](#3-anti-ship-missiles)

1. [Conflict Overview and Contamination Scale](#1-conflict-overview) 2. [Priority UXO Threats by Volume](#2-priority-uxo-threats) 3. [Bombs - FAB Series and UMPK](#3-bombs)

1. [Executive Summary](#1-executive-summary) 2. [Force Structure Overview](#2-force-structure-overview) 3. [Strategic Systems](#3-strategic-systems)

``` FUZE LOCATION ON ORDNANCE ITEM |

1. [PMN (Black Widow)](#pmn) 2. [PMN-2](#pmn-2) 3. [PMN-4](#pmn-4)

1. [Mortar/Artillery Nose Fuzes](#1-mortarartillery-nose-fuzes) - [V-429 / V-429E](#v-429--v-429e) - [RGM-2 / RGM-2M](#rgm-2--rgm-2m)

1. [7.62x39mm](#762x39) 2. [5.45x39mm](#545x39) 3. [7.62x54mmR](#76254r)

1. [7.62x39mm (Soviet/AK)](#762x39) 2. [5.45x39mm (Soviet/AK-74)](#545x39) 3. [7.62x54mmR (Soviet MG/Sniper)](#76254r)

Singapore operates one of the most technologically advanced drone fleets in Southeast Asia, leveraging its strong defense-industrial base (ST Engineering) and longstanding Israeli defense ties. The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) employ Israeli MALE platforms alongside indigenous small/medium UAS from

Singapore has been linked to NSM evaluation for future naval platforms. Singapore produces a range of ammunition through ST Engineering: Limited information. Singapore's strategic location at the Strait of Malacca suggests mine warfare capability, but specifics are classified.

Each data entry should include:

South Korea maintains a sophisticated drone ecosystem driven by the North Korean threat, featuring advanced indigenous development by KAI, Hanwha, Korean Air, and LIG Nex1 alongside Israeli imports. The ROK focuses on stealth UCAVs, loitering munitions, counter-drone systems, and ISR platforms for p

1. **ROK ordnance closely mirrors US systems** -- extensive US FMS and licensed production. Many munitions are direct copies or Korean-modified US designs with Korean markings (Hangul). 2. **KGGB** uses standard Mk 80 bomb bodies -- the guidance kit is the Korean-unique component. 3. **Chunmoo DPICM

Formal statistical analysis is reserved for **life-safety and operational decisions** where rigor directly impacts outcomes. This includes: Formal statistics are **NOT required** for: For intelligence-driven estimates (stockpiles, inventories, production, force structure), use:

Taiwan has invested heavily in indigenous drone development through NCSIST (National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology) as a key asymmetric capability against PRC invasion scenarios. The Chien Hsiang (Sword Xiang) anti-radiation loitering munition is Taiwan's most significant indigenous

1. **Taiwan ordnance markings** use Traditional Chinese characters (not Simplified). NCSIST lot numbers and ROC military date coding (ROC calendar: ROC year = Western year - 1911). 2. **HF-3** supersonic missile wreckage will contain ramjet fuel residue and composite materials. Known 2016 accidental

Thailand operates a modest drone fleet sourced primarily from China and Israel, with growing domestic industry capabilities. The Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTAF) use drones for border surveillance (Myanmar, Cambodia, Malaysia borders), counter-insurgency in the deep south (Pattani/Yala/Narathiwat), an

The JAS 39 Gripen C/D brings Swedish/European weapons to the RTAF inventory: Thailand acceded to the Ottawa Treaty in 1998. AP mine stocks destroyed. Legacy mine contamination remains from: The Malay-Muslim insurgency in Thailand's deep south (Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, Songkhla) produces significan

1. [Russian Submunitions -- Gap Fill](#1-russian-submunitions) - [1.1 3B30 (DPICM)](#11-3b30) - [1.2 9N22 (HE-Frag, FROG-7)](#12-9n22)

Cluster submunitions ("bombies" in Laos) are the single largest category of UXO casualties. Their small size, bright colors, and ball/toy-like shapes make them especially lethal to children. - BLU-26/B: CBU-24 (SUU-30 dispenser, 665 bomblets), CBU-29, CBU-37, CBU-58 - BLU-24/B: Various CBU dispe

Vietnam's military drone program is modest but expanding. The Vietnam People's Army (VPA) operates a mix of Israeli-origin ISR platforms, Russian-influenced systems, and growing indigenous programs through Viettel and military research institutes. Vietnam's drone procurement is diversifying away fro

1. **RUSSIAN-ORIGIN ORDNANCE DOMINATES**: Vietnam's military inventory is overwhelmingly Russian/Soviet. Standard Russian ordnance identification applies. 2. **S-300PMU1** is the most advanced SAM -- any engagement debris will contain large rocket motor sections and complex electronics. 3. **Kilo-cl

``` SUBMUNITION FOUND IN UKRAINE │

1. **Observe** from a safe distance (minimum exclusion zone for largest possible item) 2. **Identify** body shape, size, color, markings, and fin type 3. **Cross-reference** with profiles below

1. [Drone Size Comparison Chart](#drone-size-comparison-chart) 2. [Shahed-136 / Geran-2](#shahed-136--geran-2) 3. [Shahed-131 / Geran-1](#shahed-131--geran-1)

The following items are listed in order of encounter frequency and civilian casualty risk. For field identification, approximate size comparisons:

1. [Japanese Aerial Bombs](#japanese-aerial-bombs) 2. [Japanese Mortar Rounds](#japanese-mortar-rounds) 3. [Japanese Artillery Shells](#japanese-artillery-shells)

1. [FAB-250 M-62](#fab-250-m-62) 2. [FAB-500 M-62](#fab-500-m-62) 3. [FAB-1500 M-54](#fab-1500-m-54)

1. [MZD-2 Anti-Personnel Fragmentation Submunition](#mzd-2-anti-personnel-fragmentation-submunition) 2. [MZD-4 Anti-Personnel Fragmentation Submunition](#mzd-4-anti-personnel-fragmentation-submunition) 3. [Chinese DPICM Dual-Purpose Submunition](#chinese-dpicm-dual-purpose-submunition)

1. [Pressure Plate Switch](#pressure-plate-switch) 2. [Clothespin Switch](#clothespin-switch) 3. [Crush Wire Switch](#crush-wire-switch)

1. [YM-I (AP Blast)](#ym-i-ap-blast) 2. [Pedal Mine No. 4 (AP Blast)](#pedal-mine-no-4-ap-blast) 3. [YM-IV (AP Bounding)](#ym-iv-ap-bounding)

1. [PMN ("Black Widow")](#pmn-black-widow) 2. [PMN-2](#pmn-2) 3. [PMN-4](#pmn-4)

A multimodal AI agent that accepts photos of ordnance items and returns: 1. **Identification** — What it is (designation, type, country of origin) 2. **Confidence level** — How certain the ID is

1. [Japanese Explosive Compounds](#japanese-explosive-compounds) 2. [Japanese Aerial Bombs](#japanese-aerial-bombs) 3. [Japanese Mortar Rounds](#japanese-mortar-rounds)